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MARKETING MISSOURI RIVER WATER: COMPETING
PLANS FOR COMMODITIZING A NATURAL RESOURCE
JOHN H. DAVIDSON

ABSTRACT
The Missouri River ran free across a large piece of the North American
continent until, during the 1940s, accumulated national and regional
economic concerns led to comprehensive federal development. Six vast
dams were constructed on the main channel, impounding somewhere near
seventy-five million acre-feet of water, controlling floods and generating
electricity, while supporting navigation, recreation and wildlife. As the
twentieth century closed it had become apparent that the larger portion of
the waters impounded in the federal reservoirs were not allocated to or in
demand for any project purposes, and therefore available for use.
Somewhat remote geography and a lack of demand in the vicinity of the
reservoirs proved to be temporarily insulating, allowing the growth of a
recreation industry around the reservoirs. This period of repose may now
be closing. The advance of pipeline technology now makes long distance
water transfers to water short economies in the south and west feasible.
Closer-in, immediate demand for withdrawals exists to support energy
fields in and around North Dakota. This Essay attempts to briefly describe
previous and current efforts to market reservoir waters, and provides details
of the federal laws which authorize water marketing. The larger purpose,
however, is to initiate discussion of the significant policy questions which
the author believes will be raised in the near future.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Crowding of the continent, demand for land, water, air, and minerals,
along with the intensification of agricultural production are ever-present
themes in natural resources policy. Every place and activity now seems to
affect every other. The advance of technologies magnifies scale while
collapsing time and distance, leading inevitably toward tension over control
and access to coveted but limited resources.
Resisting change are the communities, individuals, economies, and
political entities located near, and currently reliant upon, the natural
resources, particularly water, forest, air, and open space, which represent
amenity, ecosystem and economic values. Such resources are typically seen
as uniquely local or regional assets—in some way proprietary—leading to
an assumption that current uses and enjoyment will continue. This repose is
usually the result of reliance on some combination of laws, geography,
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history, political power and economic investment. Yet, legal jurisdiction
over natural resources is seldom confined to state or local law. In the
typical case, there is a strong federal presence due to land ownership,
sovereign obligations, or heavy federal investment, resulting in a national
public interest that may appear to be in competition with both state and
local expectations. In addition, where a resource extends across state
boundaries, interstate competition may defeat cooperation.
Thus, the case of the Missouri River combining all of these elements.
The economic values associated with the River today result from a huge
federal development program, the benefits of which extend beyond the
basin states to the national economy. In time, the benefits of this federal
investment may shift sharply in favor of out-of-basin uses. Meanwhile, the
states in the basin have failed to cooperate in managing the river, and
instead, each state has vigorously asserted its most parochial interests.
II. THE MISSOURI RIVER
The Missouri River is the longest river in the United States. Its 2,540
miles drain one-sixth of the continent, stretching from headwaters in
Wyoming and Montana to its mouth deep in the State of Missouri, where it
spills into the Mississippi River, providing it with the water necessary to
carry the nation’s commerce to the Gulf of Mexico. Equally as important, a
series of six massive reservoirs have been constructed on the river’s main
channel, creating three of the five largest man-made lakes in the United
States. With a combined storage capacity of seventy-four million acre-feet,
it is the largest system of reservoirs in the United States.1 In the upper
basin, the two large reservoirs, behind Garrison Dam in North Dakota and
Oahe Dam in South Dakota, together store in excess of 46.9 million acrefeet of mountain and prairie runoff.2 The Missouri River below the dams
flows into the lower basin, where it is channeled within levees and provides
a free-flowing navigation channel to the Mississippi.
The Missouri River Basin encompasses ten states, several Canadian
provinces, twenty-five Indian tribes, and nearly the full range of human
land uses.3 It includes major metropolitan areas, relatively unpopulated
expanses, sub-humid dry lands in the upper basin, and lands of water

1. JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM xii (1993).
2. North Dakota v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 264 F. Supp. 2d 871, 874-75 (D. N.D. 2003).
3. See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, The Missouri River, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
Pt. XI (A.K. Kelley ed., 2012).
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abundance in the lower.4 Its modern history is that of conflict between the
upper and lower basins, and the inability of basin states to achieve any level
of accord in river management. In sum, the basin, as developed, enjoys an
abundance of stored water.
This essay argues that an abundance of stored and flowing water will
inevitably attract interest from geographical areas not so endowed and by
municipal and industrial interests in pursuit of reliable new supplies.
Assuming that such interest does or will soon exist, questions emerge. Is
there a legal structure and process available that provides for the transfer of
water from Missouri River reservoirs? Is use of the reservoir water limited
to the river’s basin, or can the waters be transported for use out of the
basin? Do the basin states and Indian tribes have rights to any of the stored
water in the reservoirs and, if so, by what process are they able to exercise
control? Are there enforceable rules that assure that the River’s ecosystem
retains a natural vitality?
III. INDUSTRIAL WATER MARKETING UNDER THE FLOOD
CONTROL ACT OF 1944
The river of Lewis and Clark and the Missouri River ecosystem
underwent lasting alteration by a massive water development known as the
Pick-Sloan Plan, created by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (“FCA 1944”).5
The project combined two movements prevalent in the early part of the last
century. First, the progressive conservation movement was committed to
the idea that multiple-purpose, basin-wide water development projects
could stimulate economic growth in arid or economically under-developed
regions. Second, the arid lands reclamation, or irrigation, movement, which
was promoted by land development and irrigation enthusiasts.6 Political
momentum for the project resulted from prolonged drought in the 1930s,
promotion by navigation and irrigation interests, a desire for public works
projects to reduce unemployment and provide work for returning soldiers,
and the effects on the lower basin of several large floods.7 The final
legislation was the result of the reconciliation of two separate and
conflicting plans for development of the Basin. The report for the U.S.
4. A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 1, 2 (1997); Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River
Management, 83 NEB. L. REV. 305, 307 (2004).
5 Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (1944), (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460d,
825s; 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-1, 701a-1, 701b-1, 708, 709; 43 U.S.C. § 390; and notes at 33 U.S.C.A. §§
701c, f & j (2006)).
6. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE
PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 28 (2002).
7 Id. at 28-29, and FERRELL, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) was prepared by Colonel Lewis A.
Pick.8 The report for the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) was prepared
by W.G. Sloan.9 The Corp’s plan emphasized flood control and navigation
utilizing large dams and reservoirs on the main stem of the River. The
Bureau’s goals were irrigation and hydropower, and proposed
approximately ninety dams and reservoirs, along with several hundred
irrigation projects.10 Both plans included varying numbers of large
mainstem reservoirs. After negotiations, the two plans were reconciled,11
and enacted into law, with legislative recognition and incorporation by
reference to the reconciled plans.12 Although formally reconciled, the two
plans were far from a compromise. The legislation “was an impossible
attempt to satisfy the competing agencies [which] . . . contained nearly
every project proposed in both Pick’s and Sloan’s plans.”13 In fact, the
legislation included inconsistencies and conflicts, and was passed on a hope
“that the engineers would manage the abundant water resources of the basin
in a manner that would avert potential conflict.”14 The legal, political, and
physical history of the Act is of the struggle to deal with the inherent
problems. In many respects, this has been the case. Five mainstem dams
were constructed, and the pre-existing Fort Peck reservoir was integrated
into the system. Each dam generates hydroelectricity, provides partial
protection from floods to cities and farms downstream and allows for
management of flows to support navigation seasons in most years. In
addition, the reservoirs themselves now support recreation industries.
Numerous irrigation works have been constructed upstream of the Dakotas,
although the Sloan Plan’s dream of a vast irrigation regime across both
Dakotas is unrealized.15 In the broadest sense, the clear purpose of the
Pick-Sloan legislation was economic stimulus through agricultural and

8. Pick Plan, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN: LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. DOC.
NO. 78-475 (1944).
9. Sloan Plan, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN: CONSERVATION, CONTROL AND USE OF WATER
RESOURCES, S. DOC. NO. 78-191 (1944).
10. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 29.
11. Pick-Sloan Plan, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CONCILIATION
OF S. DOC. 191 AND H. DOC. 475, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-247 (1944).
12. Section 9 of FCA 1944 reads in part: “The general comprehensive plans set forth in
House Document 475 and Senate Document 191, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, as
revised and coordinated by Senate Document 247, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, are
hereby approved and shall be prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the
Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements.” Flood Control Act of
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887.
13. SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND
REDISCOVERY TO WESTERN WATER POLICY 125 (1993).
14. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 16.
15. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 45-46.
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industrial growth, all perceived as serving a national interest. It was “a
basin-wide plan most likely to yield the greatest good to the greatest
number of people”16 and allowed for modifications when physical and
economic conditions make necessary.17
The original Pick-Sloan
contemplated extensive diversion of water from mainstem reservoirs to
large canals capable of providing irrigation water to vast portions of the
eastern Dakotas.18 This plan contemplated an annual cycle during which
summer reservoir levels would be lowered substantially. As events
unfolded, irrigation in the Dakotas did not develop and navigation in the
lower river diminished. The resulting surplus of water in the reservoirs
provided a basis for the surprise growth of an upstream recreation economy
based on flat water fishing. The surplus also allowed the Corps a level of
flexibility in water management that it employed to respond to legal
challenges under the Endangered Species Act and periodic drought, while
still delivering cooling water for downstream electrical power stations and
production of hydroelectricity at the dams. The availability of ample
surpluses in the reservoirs also mooted potentially nettlesome legal
controversies involving Indian and states’ rights in river flows. One of the
designated purposes of the Pick-Sloan plan—marketing of water for
industrial purposes—has been slower to materialize, although the
legislation leaves little doubt as to this goal. Section 6 of the FCA 1944
reads:
The Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts with States,
municipalities, private concerns, or individuals, at such prices and
on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for domestic and
industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any
reservoir under the control of the War Department: Provided, That
no contracts for such water shall adversely affect then existing
lawful uses of such water. All moneys received from such

16. S. DOC. NO. 78-191, at p. 17 (1944).
17. Id.
18 The Initial Stage of the Oahe Irrigation Project alone would have resulted in the diversion
of 444,400 acre-feet of water from Oahe Dam, and irrigated 190,000 acres of land. Allowing for
return flows and water from downstream tributaries, the average annual depletion at Sioux City,
Iowa, would have been 303,200 acre-feet, representing 1.3 percent of the average annual flow
there. Oahe Unit, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN PROJECT, SOUTH DAKOTA, H.R. DOC. NO. 90-163
(1967). The complete Oahe irrigation plan provided for increasing the irrigable area to 495,000
acres, providing M & I water to 23 towns and cities, as well as fish and wildlife developments at
twenty-nine locations. H.R. DOC. NO., 90-163 at 3. This doubling of irrigation, combined with
the vastly larger proposed irrigation project in North Dakota (Garrison) would presumable have
made an impact on downstream flows at some point, especially in dry years.
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contracts shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States as
miscellaneous receipts.19
The legislative history supporting the authority to contract delivery of
industrial water is equally straightforward. The Sloan Plan20 contains the
more explicit discussion, identifying industrial water clearly as a project
purpose.21 In addition, the Sloan Plan also acknowledges that there will be
a “greater requirement[ ] for industrial water supplies” in the future.22
The Pick Plan identifies industrial water marketing as a project purpose
while predictably focusing on flood control. It also reflects with some
emphasis that the multi-purpose objectives will evolve with the public
interest:
[The project] contemplates that the uses of presently authorized
and existing multiple-purpose reservoirs will be progressively
broadened and reapportioned as additional water is stored by the
dams . . . . When completed the basin plan will be operated for
maximum multiple-purpose use. Thus preference can be given to
the functions which contribute most significantly to the welfare
and livelihood of the people of the various parts of the basin, and
at the same time adequate steps may be taken to meet new
economic situations that may arise in the future.23
As already observed, the final version of the FCA 1944 combined the
Pick and Sloan Plans, leaving open the issue of how to deal with the
interdependent and potentially conflicting uses of navigation, flood control,
hydropower, irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses.

19. Flood Control Act of 1944, 66 Stat. 93, 33 U.S.C. § 708.
20. Sloan Plan, supra note 9 at 10. “To the extent that the uses of water are competitive, the
use of water for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes should have preference.” Page 13
of the Report states: “In the future there will also be greater requirements for industrial water
supplies.”
21. “To the extent that the several functions of water control and utilization are conflicting,
preference should be given to those which make the greatest contribution to the well-being of the
people and to the areas of greatest need. To the extent that the uses of water are competitive, the
use of water for domestic, agricultural and industrial purposes should have preference.” Id. at 10
and quoted in Environmental Defense Fund v. Morton, 420 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (D. Mont. 1976).
22. Sloan Plan, supra note 8, at 13.
23. Pick Plan, supra note 7, at 3. MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN’S
PICK-SLOAN PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DETERMINATION 77-79 (1953)
observes that the section authorizing the U.S. Corps of Engineers to sell surplus water was
“particularly debated,” and further observes that “multiple purpose” means “to harness completely
the water resources of the basin for all useful purposes.
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IV. PRIOR EXPERIENCES WITH INDUSTRIAL WATER
MARKETING IN THE BASIN
Marketing water from the River for municipal or industrial purposes,
although authorized in the original legislation, is a concept that has been
emerging slowly. It is only now beginning to take on momentum. The
emergence is marked by several Supreme Court opinions and by early
attempts to develop water from market.
A. THE MONTANA LITIGATION
As part of the Pick-Sloan project the Bureau constructed the Yellowtail
Reservoir in south central Montana and the Boysen Reservoir in Wyoming.
Each project serves multiple purposes, including irrigation, hydropower,
and flood control. In 1975, the Bureau entered into contracts for the sale of
reservoir waters for industrial purposes. Agricultural and environmental
interest groups filed suit seeking to enjoin the sales, arguing that the FCA
1944 did not authorize such sales.24 The trial court’s opinion describes and
analyzes the legislative history of Section 6 in detail, concluding that the
FCA 1944 “authorizes use of project water for industrial purposes and also
expressly authorizes the marketing thereof . . . .”25 The opinion also
observes that the Pick-Sloan Plan “would develop in stages with sufficient
flexibility to meet unforeseen changes in the physical and economic
conditions of the area.”26 Finally, “[t]he Congressional debate also
indicated an awareness by Congress that industrial water supplies would be
developed through the proposed projects, and that unforeseen future events
might dictate substantial industrial use.”27 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, adopting with approval the district court’s
analysis of Section 6.28 The decisions represent a sharp approval of the
industrial marketing purpose in FCA 1944, and their analysis of Section 6
retains validity. We shall soon see, however, that the Supreme Court has
held that the power to market water from the mainstem reservoirs is a
matter for the Corps rather than the Bureau.29 Together the decisions
established a solid set of judicial interpretations that support the marketing
of water from reservoirs.

24.
25.
26
27
28
29.

Morton, 420 F. Supp. at 1040.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
90 CONG. REC., pt. 3, 4119 (1944).
Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1979).
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1988).
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B. SOUTH DAKOTA AND THE ETSI LITIGATION
In 1974, the Wyoming State Legislature authorized its State Engineer
to issue permits from the Madison groundwater formation to Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc. (“ETSI”), a private joint venture, for use in a
coal slurry pipeline designed to ship Great Plains coal to the south central
United States.30 Coal slurry is a mixture of pulverized coal and water, and a
The Wyoming
slurry pipeline efficiently transports bulk coal.31
groundwater permits entitled ETSI to withdraw an average of 15,000 acrefeet of water per year.32
The success of the ETSI proposal depended on a world influenced by
the OPEC oil embargo of the 1970s—a world of inflation, energy shortages,
and regulated railroad shipping rates.33 These factors all disappeared by the
early 1980s, and the ETSI project was ultimately abandoned. However, the
events that occurred during project development provided a case study for a
time when industrial uses of reservoir water were proposed.
The proposed ETSI well field was located adjacent to the WyomingSouth Dakota border and presented a challenge to South Dakota’s water
managers and policy makers. The projected drawdown of the local
Madison aquifer over time was a direct threat to municipal well fields in
South Dakota, and the effect on surface water flows threatened drinking
water and waste management, as well as environmental and aesthetic
impacts on the tourist and outdoor recreation economy of the Black Hills
region.34
South Dakota faced an uneasy situation. Its option to actively resist
potential damage was limited to lengthy litigation with little prospect of
success. This situation changed dramatically when, in 1981, ETSI
expressed a willingness to look to the Oahe Reservoir as a primary source
for its project and to hold its Wyoming water rights as a reserve.35 A
pipeline carrying Missouri River water from the Oahe Reservoir to
Wyoming coal preparation stations presented South Dakota with several
advantages.

30. John P. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 347, 380 (1985); South Dakota
and the ETSI Experience, in NEW SOURCES OF WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND
GROWTH: INTERBASIN TRANSFERS 3.66 (1982), available at http://ufdc.ufl.edu/WL00000
321/00001.
31 Nancy Taylor Reed, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues Raised by the
Development of Coal Slurry Pipelines, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 528, 530 (1976).
32 South Dakota and the ETSI Experience, supra note 30, at 3.66.
33. Id.
34. South Dakota and the ETSI Experience, supra note 30, at 3.66.
35. Id. at 3.68.
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First, the proposed pipeline option avoided the need for a legal
confrontation over the Madison aquifer water permits. Second, it allowed a
practical method for addressing another state issue—the delivery of reliable
supplies for domestic and stock watering use in the open range between the
Missouri River and the Black Hills.36 ETSI was willing to contract to
provide water to western South Dakota communities along the pipeline
route, a result that would otherwise be achieved only by large-scale public
subsidy. Third, ETSI proved willing to pay money to the State of South
Dakota for the Oahe water right, a bold notion when viewed in the context
of western water law systems that are based on rights claimed free of charge
to private users.37
Fourth, the U.S. Supreme Court in 198238 ruled that the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause precluded states from preventing exports of water from
within their boundaries for parochial, political, or economic reasons. In
other words, the court’s ruling established that water is an item of
commerce, subject to federal regulation, and states may not interfere with
commerce in water.39 South Dakota interpreted this ruling as a precursor to
an active water market in which it hoped to be an early entrant. Finally, the
timing of the ETSI proposal was significant because it coincided with a new
requirement by the federal executive that state and local governments
contribute a share toward federally subsidized water projects within their
boundaries.40 At that time, economically advanced states were in a position
to meet the local share requirement, but South Dakota, with a small
population and an agrarian economy, was not in a position to contribute,
making it considerably more difficult, if not impossible, to compete for
federal subsidies. ETSI’s willingness to pay for Oahe water thus provided a
potential fund on which future water development would be based.41
This innovative approach required supporting state legislation by a
special session of the South Dakota Legislature, and as the pieces of the
complex puzzle came into place, the Governor could summarize:
Once this agreement began to take shape and it appeared that our
goals with respect to preserving the Madison Formation, providing
water to Western South Dakota communities, and obtaining
36. Id. at 3.67.
37. Id. at 3.68.
38. Sporhase v. Neb. Ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982).
39. Id. at 953-54 (recognizing the “Western States’ interest[ ] . . . in conserving and
preserving scarce water resources,” while categorizing such interests as “not irrelevant” to
commerce clause inquiry and granting Congress the “power to deal with” water problems on a
national scale).
40 Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082.
41 Zellmer, supra note 3, § IV(E).
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money for water development were actually achievable, it became
impossible for South Dakota to reject this virtual bird in the hand
in favor of protracted and uncertain litigation that might
accomplish only one of our goals.42
Success of the proposed transbasin diversion depended upon a large
supply of unappropriated water and a legally valid state water right. State
water law is based on the familiar principal of seniority of rights, and the
availability, value, and security of a right to use water is dependent on its
original appropriation date.43 Because virtually all of the surplus water
impounded behind the Oahe and Garrison dams was then, and is now,
unappropriated under state law, the ETSI project developers were in a
position to claim a secure senior water right, assuming that state water law
governed. South Dakota took the position that, at the least, it was entitled
to issue state water permits from its share of natural flows from the main
channel of the Missouri River, while holding open a potential claim to a
share of water impounded by the federal dam.44
Implementing the deal required special state legislation in order to
address several specific problems. Because the state constitution prohibited
transfers of special privilege to private parties, it was necessary to craft
legislation of general applicability.45 The solution was a law that would
allow a state-chartered special district—the South Dakota Conservancy
District—to apply for and to obtain water rights for the purpose of selling
them to third persons for consideration in energy development use in and
out of the state. Nothing in the legislation was specific to ETSI, and the
general statute remains on the books.46
Under state water law, water rights are issued to successful applicants
free of financial charge.47 The ETSI developers, however, were willing to
pay the State of South Dakota for water, provided that a lawful mechanism
for the purpose could be established.
Arranging payment to the
Conservancy District solved this problem and, as a practical matter, put the

42. Janklow, supra note 30, at 3.68-3.69.
43. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 383 (1985) (describing actions by states to claim “ownership”
of waters).
44 In a subsequent decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals left open the question of
whether the state held an interest in Lake Oahe water. See infra note 63.
45. Janklow, supra note 30, at 3.69.
46. For an overview of South Dakota’s special state-sponsored water development districts,
see generally John H. Davidson, South Dakota’s Special Water Districts—An Introduction, 36
S.D. L. REV. 499, 533 (1991).
47. Id. at 530.
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State in the business of selling water rights to energy companies, whether in
or out of the state.48
South Dakota’s legal strategy could not be limited to state legislation,
however, because the water to be appropriated lay in storage behind the
federal Oahe Dam. In order for the State’s scheme to succeed, it required
recognition of the state water right (and, it follows, the lucrative sales
contract) by the appropriate federal water management agency. However,
the FCA 1944,49 which governs management of the Missouri River,
delegates authority to two agencies—and the statutory difference between
the two is substantial. The Corps is charged with constructing the large
dams on the main river channel and managing them for flood control,
navigation, and hydropower.50 The Bureau, part of the Department of the
Interior, is charged with developing projects that carry water from the main
reservoirs to various irrigation projects to be developed in the upper basin.51
The irrigation projects from the dams on the main channel never
materialized and are generally agreed to be impractical.52 The mixture of
legislative authorizations caused the Corps to construct and operate the
dams, reservoirs, and navigation channel, while the Bureau maintained
paper authority but few projects on the ground.53
The laws that govern the operation of the Bureau of Reclamation
provide water marketing authority, as well as a saving clause that states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to
affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any State or
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution
of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder,
and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws.54
Section 8, as it is known, requires the Bureau to conform to state law in
the delivery of mainstem water, a constraint that was viewed at the time as
basic by the upper basin states, which were and are concerned that state
control may be subordinated to the Corp’s traditional preference for
48. See id. at 534 (the Conservancy District “may directly acquire water rights as well as
market water, and it can market hydroelectric power generated by its water projects.”) (internal
citations omitted).
49. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78–534, § 2, 58 Stat. 887 (1944).
50. William A. Hillhouse II, The Federal Law of Water Resources Development, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 844, 846 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974).
51. Id. at 848.
52. See Guhin, supra note 30, at 430 (noting the tentative but unlikely future course of the
project).
53. Zellmer, supra note 4, § IV.
54. Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1902).
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managing rivers for flood control and navigation. For South Dakota, a
reservoir withdrawal permit issued by the Bureau would be subject to
Section 8, and would validate the ETSI water right, because section 9(c) of
the FCA 1944 states that “reclamation . . . developments [are] to be
undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior . . . governed by the Federal
Reclamation Laws.”55 The State thus reasoned that a significant portion of
the water in storage behind the Oahe Dam was intended for irrigation that
was unlikely to be developed in the foreseeable future. Additionally, it
reasoned that the use of “irrigation water” ought to be governed by
reclamation laws, including Section 8 recognition of state water permits,
even when the waters are marketed for energy development.
In contrast, Section 6 of the FCA 1944, as we have seen, authorizes the
Corps to “make contracts . . . for domestic and industrial uses for surplus
water that may be available at any reservoir under the control of” the
Corps.56 Thus, when the Corps designates waters in the reservoirs as
“surplus,” it can market the water independently of the states, without
recognition of state water permits, and without risk of sale by the state. The
water is subject to a mere administrative permit rather than a legally
recognizable appropriation of a property interest. Because the Corp’s
constitutional authority is pursuant to the Commerce Clause as expressed
through the navigation servitude,57 it may be assumed that the Agency
enjoys the broadest discretion in administering its statutory authority to
market surplus water, even in the face of opposition from basin states.
The ETSI project collapsed as economic circumstances changed, but
the process still matters. There was widespread opposition to the ETSI
proposal, particularly from downstream states in the basin, as well as from
the railroads that competed in the business of hauling coal and across whose
tracks the slurry pipeline needed to pass.58 Most important is the federal
court challenge brought by the lower basin states that were concerned with
what they saw as a precedent for out-of-basin transfers at the initiative of a
single upper basin state; the suit sought to invalidate the water marketing
permit issued to South Dakota by the Bureau.59 The challenge raised the
general question of whether an upper basin state, or any basin state, held

55. Flood Control Act, § 9(c).
56 33 U.S.C. § 708.
57 See Tarlock, supra note 43, at 402 (discussing the move from limited federal power based
on navigability to increased federal power “with the full reach of the Commerce Clause.”).
58. Janklow, supra note 34, at 3.71.
59 ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 498 (1988).
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independent rights in the stored reservoir water.60 This water right was
issued, after all, by a state rather than a federal agency.61
The downstream states brought suit in federal district court in Nebraska
to block the ETSI diversion from Oahe Reservoir.62 The issue then was a
narrow one: whether Congress in the FCA 1944 intended the reservoir
behind Oahe Dam to be a reclamation facility subject to the water
marketing authority of the Secretary of the Interior.63 The district court
ruled for the plaintiff lower basin states,64 and the court of appeals
affirmed.65 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior
lacked authority under the FCA 1944 to make a contract allowing the state
to use and sell water, and held the contract void.66 The decision was a
singular victory for the downstream states.
The ETSI ruling concluded that because the reservoirs are under the
control of the Corps, the Corps has the sole authority to market water from
them.67 Therefore, the Corps may market water that it determines to be
“surplus,” that is, “all water that can be made available from the reservoir
without adversely affecting other lawful uses of the water.”68 Described in
this way, the Corps’s assertion of power is broad and leaves open the
question whether any basin state has independent rights in stored reservoir
water, absent express congressional action. The Supreme Court’s opinion
supports a position by the Corps that it can declare reservoir water held for
irrigation as dedicated to “project purposes,” such as hydroelectric
generation, or it can declare water “surplus” and available for marketing
under Section 6. Though the Court did not directly address “the relative
interests of the United States and South Dakota in Lake Oahe water,”69 it
read Section 6 as granting the Corps “exclusive authority to contract to
remove water for industrial uses” from reservoir projects, like Oahe, that
the Corps has constructed and operates,70 and that the language of Section 6
is “plain in every respect.”71

60
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 503.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 498.
Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (D. Neb. 1984).
Id. at 1281.
Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 287 (8th Cir. 1986).
ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 505.
Id. at 506.
Id.; see also, Guhin, supra note 30, at 378; Guhin, supra note 25, at 378.
Id. at 498 n.2.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 505.
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V. THE ETSI MODEL REVISITED: THE WESTERN AREA WATER
SUPPLY PROJECT
Demand for industrial use water diversions from Missouri River
reservoirs remained quiet from the ETSI period to around 2009 when oil
and gas production in western North Dakota’s Bakken field grew rapidly.
Until then, the prevailing view was that the region’s oil shale deposits could
not be extracted economically, but advances in the technology of hydraulic
fracturing now allow for cost-effective extraction, provided there is a
bountiful supply of fresh water.72 Each well requires water not only for
hydraulic fracturing, but also drilling, casing and maintenance of wells,73
and demand can reach more than thirteen acre-feet per well.74 Hydraulic
fracturing generally requires between 2.3 and 3.8 million gallons per well.
1 to 1.5 million gallons are required to drill a Bakken formation well;
50,000 to 100,000 gallons of water are required to drill a non-oil shale well.
Based on current projections of Bakken region growth through 2019,
Bakken wells could require up to 51,000 acre-feet of water.75 Inevitably,
energy industries are looking to the Missouri River to meet this demand.
Local groundwater supplies are unable to meet such quantities, and the
energy industry relies on truckers to meet immediate needs. Leaders in the
state of North Dakota recognized a situation that resembled the ETSI case
of the 1980s. There was a need to finance a new water delivery system for
ranchers and municipalities in its arid western region. A regional boom in
energy production was dependent on a bountiful supply of water, and state
government perceived an opportunity to capture value from state-issued
water rights and take advantage of an emerging market in water. Subsumed
in this perception was a federal-state tension over control of river water for
industrial and municipal use.
The result is a state-level special district known as the Western Area
Water Supply Authority (“WAWSA”),76 and the concept is straightforward.
State water rights in Missouri River water are held by WAWSA, which
builds a rural-municipal water system sufficient to meet the projected longterm needs of a large area in western North Dakota. In the near term, this
72. OMAHA DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, GARRISON DAM/LAKE
SAKAKAWEA PROJECT, NORTH DAKOTA: SURPLUS WATER REPORT i-iii (March 2011).
73. Id. at ii.
74. Id. at 3-7.
75 Jeffrey T. Matson, Water Resources and the Oil and Gas Boom: Impacts to States and
Tribes, N.D. L. REV. ENERGY L. LECTURE SER. (Mar. 14-15, 2013).
76 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-40-01 to 09 (2013).
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system will have considerable excess capacity that will be made available to
the thirsty energy industry. Revenue from sales to energy users will retire
as much as 80 percent of the system’s cost. The original construction costs
will be met by loans from the state.77 What South Dakota was unable to
achieve in the 1980s is now likely to occur in North Dakota. The principal,
and important, difference is that whereas the ETSI pipeline would have
exported Missouri River water from the basin, the North Dakota project
will use the water in the basin although its use will be almost entirely
consumptive, generating no return flows.78 As in the case of ETSI,
however, WAWSA moves forward without addressing the question of legal
control over waters impounded in the reservoirs. The assumption is that the
North Dakota project’s water right will not, when added to all other state
water permits in river water, exceed North Dakota’s equitable share of the
river’s natural flow. Of course, that equitable share has not been
established. The fact that WAWSA’s water will be drawn from the
Missouri River under a North Dakota water permit does not implicate the
issue of rights in stored reservoir water.
VI. MARKETING OF INDUSTRIAL WATER BY THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS
Spurred by changes in the energy economy, the concept of water
marketing pursuant to the FCA 1944 is finally taking on a concrete form.
Although the Corps has had legislative authority through Section 6, it is
only now building the administrative structure necessary for
implementation. In doing so, it is breaking new ground.
A. INTRODUCTION
As a direct result of this growth in production, oil producers also
approached the Corps requesting Missouri River water from Lake
Sakakawea, behind Garrison Dam. The agency responded by concluding
that 100,000 acre-feet of surplus water is available to meet oil field needs
for the next ten years,79 and offered contracts of five years with a right of
renewal for another five.
The Corp’s decision to provide surplus water for industrial use is based
in part on its conclusion that the oil field demand is “of a temporary
77 Western Area Water Supply Project, available at http://www.wawsp.com/facts.asp (last
visited June 6, 2013).
78 The North Dakota legislature does not prohibit the authority from selling water outside
the basin. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-40-05(6) (2013).
79. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST. GARRISON DAM/LAKE SAKAKAWEA
SURPLUS WATER REPORT & ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, add. 1 (2012).
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purpose.”80 Although the Corp’s report does not provide the basis for so
concluding, it must be that there are ultimately a finite number of wells to
be drilled and serviced; whether that finite number will be reached in five,
ten, or fifty years, it does not say. Nonetheless, it is significant that the
contracts are to be granted on the basis of an assumption that they are
temporary.
Currently, the Corps is reacting only to specific requests for surplus
water from the North Dakota reservoir. In order to satisfy these requests, it
elected to proceed to issue Surplus Water Reports for each of the six mainstem reservoirs and allocate specific quantities for each. In total, just under
283,000 acre-feet is allocated from the combined reservoirs.
Whether water is surplus within the meaning of Section 6 is based on a
simple determination that water in a reservoir is “not required because the
authorized use for the water never developed or the need was reduced by
changes that occurred since authorization of construction.”81 Because the
original Sloan Plan contemplated irrigation across vast acreages of the
Dakotas, none of which has occurred, the determination that there is water
surplus to project purposes is an easy one. Consider, as a single example,
that the Oahe irrigation project in South Dakota alone would have diverted
from the Oahe reservoir 444,000 acre-feet per year.82 The current Surplus
Water Report for the Oahe reservoir allocates only 57,317 acre-feet for
industrial water uses, a small percentage of the water for irrigation which
never developed.
The Corp’s current industrial water marketing proposals conclude that
the Pick-Sloan Plan contemplated that a total of 3,853,000 acre-feet of
impounded reservoir waters in the system was for use in irrigation projects
which have not developed.83 By the Corp’s reasoning, all of this is now
available for industrial water marketing in the event that demand should
arise. In addition, a realistic appraisal supports a prediction that the steady
decline in navigation on the River will continue, thereby freeing an
additional large supply of reservoir water to meet alternative demand.

80 U.S. ARMY CORPS. OF ENGINEERS, ER 1105-2-100, PLANNING GUIDANCE NOTEBOOK,
para. E-57(b)(2)(b) (2000), available at http://planning.usace.army mil/toolbox/library/
ERs/entire.pdf.
81. Id. at E-57(b)(2)(a)(1).
82. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, INITIAL STAGE,
OAHE UNIT, PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM, South Dakota III-5, III-6 (1973). HD 163,
Oahe Unit, xxvi pegs the amount at 408,400 acre-feet. The Oahe Project was de-authorized by
Congress in 1982.
83. OMAHA DISTRICT, supra note 72, at 2-10.
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B. DEFINING SURPLUS WATER
Section 6 of the FCA 1944 simply authorizes the Corps to contract “at
such prices and on such terms as [it] may deem reasonable, for domestic
and industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir
under” its control.84 The statute is silent as to whether the uses contracted
for must be temporary, but does require that they not adversely affect “then
existing lawful uses.”85 Agency regulations restate the statutory language
that surplus water is water “that may be available at any reservoir . . .
because the authorized use for the water never developed or the need was
reduced by changes that occurred since authorization and
construction . . . .”86 This regulation is rooted in a 1986 opinion by the
Army General Counsel which concluded:
In my opinion section 6 of the Flood Control Act gives the
Secretary of the Army similar authority to market water stored in
the Pick-Sloan flood control reservoirs. The Reclamation Projects
Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to reallocate and market
water not needed to fulfill the paramount reclamation purpose of
irrigation. Section 6 of the Flood Control Act provides the
Secretary of the Army similar authority with regard to water he
determines is not needed to fulfill a project purpose in Army
reservoirs.87
The Corp’s interpretation of the phrase “surplus water” is sensible on
its face and is entitled to deference according to recent Supreme Court
opinions.88 There are opposing views, however, founded in the Corp’s own
method of labeling and categorizing waters captured in its Missouri River
reservoirs. The method describes basin-wide allocations of total storage
capacity as: (1) Permanent Pool, 25%; (2) Carryover Multiple Use, 53%;
(3) Annual Flood Control and Multiple Use, 16%; and (4) Exclusive Flood
Control, 6%.89 The Corp’s interpretation is that allocations (2)-(4) are
available as “surplus waters.”
84. Flood Control Act of 1944, 66 Stat. 93, 33 U.S.C. § 708.
85. Id. It is noted that the Oahe Irrigation Project was deauthorized by Congress and is not,
therefore, an existing lawful use.
86. PLANNING GUIDANCE NOTEBOOK, supra note 80, ER 1105-2-100, ¶ 3-8(b)(4), and
¶ E-57(b)(2)(a)(1).
87 Dep’t of the Army, Office of the General Counsel, Proposed Contracts for Municipal
and Industrial Water Withdrawals from Main Stem Missouri Reservoirs, (Mar. 13, 1986).
88 In City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (U.S. 2013), Justice
Scalia for the Court wrote that the question is always “simply, whether the agency has stayed
within the bounds of its statutory authority,” and finally, “whether the statutory text forecloses the
agency’s assertion of authority, or not.”
89 FERRELL, supra note 1 at 128.
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Guhin, in his 1985 milestone article The Law of the Missouri,90 argues
that “surplus waters” are not “all” waters91 but are limited to waters
captured for the purpose of flood control. This interpretation would limit
the Corp’s Section 6 authority to Annual Flood Control and/or Exclusive
Flood Control at the most—22% or 6% respectively. Even if Guhin’s
argument is accepted, however, waters allocated by the Corps to flood
control in the basin total 16.4 million acre-feet, a considerable amount. The
Corp’s regulations, in contrast, define all but the Permanent Pool as
potentially available for “surplus” designation, an additional 53%.
C. REVISING PROJECT PURPOSES, REALLOCATING PROJECT WATER
The Corp’s regulations do more than restate the Section 6 language,
however. They declare that surplus water also includes “water that would
be more beneficially used as municipal and industrial water than for the
authorized purpose and which, when withdrawn, would not significantly
affect authorized purposes over some specified time period.”92 Going
considerably further, the regulation states that the agency has the authority
to:
[M]ake reasonable reallocations between different project
purposes. Thus, water stored for purposes no longer necessary can
be considered surplus. In addition, the Secretary may use his
broad discretionary authority to reduce project outputs, envisioned
at the time of authorization and construction, if it is believed that
the municipal and industrial use of the water is a higher and more
beneficial use . . . .”93
Although the specific contracts under consideration—small diversions
from Sakakawea for oil and gas production—fit neatly within the more
confined definition, the regulatory umbrella under which the agency claims
to be acting is strikingly broad, perhaps as broad as the constitutional
authority of the FCA 1944 itself. Reducing project outputs and making
“reasonable reallocations” so that it is “more beneficially used . . . [for] a
municipal and industrial water than for the authorized purpose” is a broad
claim of agency authority.94

90
91
92
93.
94.

See generally Guhin, supra note 30.
Id. at 180.
OMAHA DISTRICT, supra note 72, at 1-2.
Id.
Id.
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D. TEMPORARY USES ONLY?
Section 6 does not stipulate that industrial water contracts must be for
temporary, time-limited uses only. Although the Corp’s report on the
proposed Sakakawea contracts emphasizes that they are to simply meet
“urgent temporary” demands95 the agency regulations in this case are also
considerably broader, stating “[s]urplus water agreements will normally be
for small amounts of water and/or for temporary use as opposed to storage
reallocations and a permanent right to that storage. . . . Normally, surplus
water agreements will be limited to 5 year periods.”96
The regulations leave open the question of whether the FCA 1944
allows the Corps to enter into long-term industrial or municipal water use
contracts, perhaps for energy projects such as the coal slurry pipeline
envisioned by the original ETSI proposal, or to respond to lasting regional
water shortages in densely populated areas outside of the Missouri basin.
VII. PRICING RIVER WATER—COMMODITIZING RIVER WATER
The Corp’s new proposals to market industrial water specify that the
water will be sold. The administrative process is that current demand will
be met by issuing five-year contracts, with no charge for water until the
conclusion of the formal establishment of a pricing policy, which will be
the result of notice and comment rulemaking.97 Upon the adoption of a
pricing policy, existing contracts will be revised, and charges imposed.98
What the Corps is doing in the Missouri basin is a surprise only
because it has not occurred before. The FCA 1944 clearly calls for the
Corps to do precisely what it is doing. What has been absent until now is
demand. The demand that has arisen—delivery of water to North Dakota
oil and gas fields—is described as temporary, which it may be, although it
must be noted that most oil fields remain productive for lengthy periods.
By emphasizing its authority to reallocate, and by undertaking a more
permanent reallocation study, the Corps recognizes that new and more
enduring uses are likely to emerge.

95. OMAHA DISTRICT, supra note 72, at 1-3.
96 Id.
97 Memorandum from Dep’t of Army, Office of the Ass’t Sec’t Civil Works (May 8, 2012).
98. Establishing a price for surplus water will be an unprecedented undertaking, and is not
analyzed here in detail. The questions that must be answered in the process are fascinating. Will
the baseline be the cost of alternative methods of delivering water? Will cost include
reimbursable expenses of the Pick-Sloan project, including capital costs, interest, operation, and
maintenance? Will cost reflect the irrigation water subsidy and exclude interest? Will cost take
loss of ecosystem services into account or ecosystem mitigation?
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At the time of this writing, the Corps has yet to publish notice of a rulemaking process for industrial water pricing, and the context of that notice is
open to speculation; however, certain preliminary issues are presented here.
An open market for reservoir water is a first option, and there is abundant
literature on the nature of and process for reaching a proper price for a
scarce natural resource.99 It is possible that the Corps will utilize some
form of bid or other open call device. Even in an auction format, however,
the seller is entitled to establish a minimum, thus presenting the question
whether the Corps is either authorized or required to include minimum
elements in its price. It is likely, for example, that the Corps will charge the
equivalent of a connection fee to gain access to the reservoir supply, as well
as a service charge to cover costs that are not related to the quantity
diverted.
Section 6, itself, is silent on the elements of pricing and specifies only
that the monies be “deposited in the Treasury of the United States as
miscellaneous receipts.”100 When revenues from a federal water resources
development project are involved—and the Pick-Sloan project in
particular—certain complicating questions emerge. When the Pick-Sloan
project was approved in the Flood Control Act of 1944, specific purposes
were identified and portions of overall costs assigned to each. Some of
these purposes were deemed to serve a broad national interest and the
assigned costs therefore absorbed by the taxpayer directly. Such is the case
with flood control, navigation, recreation, and wildlife, which are referred
to as “non-reimbursable” costs of the project. Such non-reimbursable costs
are not included in the repayment obligation of Pick-Sloan purposes. In
contrast, a portion of the overall project cost was designated as
“reimbursable.” The primary example is the project costs assigned to
hydroelectric generation which are required to be repaid to the government
with interest over a period as long as or exceeding fifty years.
Reimbursable costs also carry an obligation to repay operation,
maintenance, and replacement costs. In the Pick-Sloan project all
reimburseables are paid into a common basin-wide account.
The legislative history of Pick-Sloan supports an argument that
municipal and industrial water is a reimbursable project cost and that prices
charged for water must include such elements as repayment of project costs

99 The proper price of a scarce resource is a question that has interested economists from
early days of the discipline. One introduction is HENRIQUE MONTEIRO, WATER PRICING
MODELS: A SURVEY (2005).
100 For example, the cost and repayment schedule for the initial stage of the Oahe irrigation
project detailed specific repayment obligations assigned to municipal and industrial water. See
H.R. DOC. 90-163, supra note 18, at 6.
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with interest, operation, maintenance, and replacement, as well as a charge
for storage in the reservoir. Moreover, if reimbursable, revenues should be
paid into the basin account. Subsequent agency planning supports this
argument as well. For example, in the original authorization of the first
phase of a now de-authorized Oahe irrigation project, it was specified that
municipal and industrial water “would provide repayment over a period of
fifty years at 3 and 1/8% interest of costs allocated to this purpose”101 and
consistently referred to municipal and industrial water revenues as
reimbursable,102 including repayment of operation, maintenance and
replacement expenses.103 Since 1986, the Corps has held the position that
water sold for municipal and industrial purposes should include a charge for
reservoir storage.104 An associated, but vital, issue is whether water pricing
should include hydroelectric sales lost or foregone as one result of
municipal and industrial water sales. In a 1986 opinion of the General
Counsel, it is stated:
In my opinion the Secretary of the Army has the discretion to
market water in Lake Sakakawea even if this results in a decrease
of the project’s actual or potential power production. Section 6
was included in the Flood Control Act to empower the Secretary
of the Army to make reasonable reallocations between the
different project purposes.105
In other words, the Corps can favor water marketing over other project
purposes when circumstances warrant such a change. Because revenues
from hydroelectric generation are the fundamental source of revenue for the
Pick-Sloan basin account, it is unlikely that the Corps would reduce them
without a replacement in the form of revenue from municipal and industrial
sales.
In contrast to the argument that revenues from water sales are
reimbursable and payable to the Pick-Sloan basin account is the clear
language of Section 6, specifying that revenue from water sales be
deposited with the U.S. Treasury “as miscellaneous receipts.”
Reimbursable costs of Pick-Sloan are paid into a basin account and not to
the general accounts of the United States. If Congress in 1944 had intended
the costs allocated to water sales to be reimbursable, it would have so
specified. Instead, it created an unambiguous exception.
101 Oahe Unit, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN PROJECT, SOUTH DAKOTA, H.R. DOC. 90-163, at
25 (1st Sess. 1967).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See supra note 82, at 10.
105 Id.
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These and other issues will arise when and if the Corps publishes a
notice of rule-making. It is sufficient here to state that the process will
involve far more than the establishment of market price. Beyond the
technicalities of price-setting, a formal process of water marketing, once
clearly established, is likely to have far-ranging effects. This argument
asserts that once a reliable price and sale process is established, new
demand will appear. Industries and municipalities across the nation are
gradually outgrowing their usable local water supplies. The rate at which
this is occurring is accelerating because of climate, deteriorating quality of
available local sources, increasing consumption, and concentration of
population in water-short regions. Historically, water has been viewed as a
local resource, but modern technologies now make long distance water
transfer an economical and technologically feasible alternative.106 With a
predictable pricing mechanism in place, long-term economic calculations
become predictable, legal questions mostly resolved, and an open market
will exist.
VIII.THE PERMANENT REALLOCATION OPTION:
APPORTIONMENT?
In addition to undertaking the sale of surplus water, the Corps has
initiated a study to determine whether the waters captured by the Pick-Sloan
dams should be permanently re-allocated. Titled the Missouri River
Municipal & Industrial Water Storage Reallocation Study, the study
according to the Corps “will systematically and comprehensively examine
whether some amount of the storage [in Pick-Sloan dams] may be allocated
solely to municipal and industrial water supply.”107 The study is based
specifically on a 1970 statute which states:
The Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of Engineers,
is authorized to review the operation of projects the construction of
which has been completed and which were constructed in the
interest of navigation, flood control, water supply and related
purposes, when found advisable due to significantly changed
physical or economic conditions, and to report thereon to Congress
with recommendations on the advisability of modifying the

106 Those who suggest that large scale long distance transfers are unrealistic are reminded
that in 2002, China began construction of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project which will
pipe 44 billion cubic meters of Yangtze River water to the Yellow River.
107 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Mun. & Indus. Water
Storage Reallocation Study (Sept. 7, 2002).
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structure or their operation and for improving the quality of the
environment in the overall public interest.108
This reallocation study supplements the Corp’s existing assertion of
authority to reallocate among project purposes when a new use “is a higher
and more beneficial use.”109 Although not so stated explicitly, the study is a
long-term effort to obtain Congressional recognition of the obvious fact that
Pick-Sloan irrigation water is surplus and available for alternative purposes.
The format of this option is a formal report and set of recommendations
to Congress. Were the Corp’s final report to specify an amount to each
state and tribe as its equitable share of the natural flow of the river, and,
were Congress to formally adopt the reallocation recommendations, it is
likely that a full apportionment will have occurred.110
IX. THE PROSPECT OF OUT-OF-BASIN TRANSFERS
The Corp’s water marketing plans place no restrictions on out-of-basin
transfers, and the legislation makes no reference to any such limits.
Although large-scale transbasin diversions have not been prevalent in recent
years, the idea is hardly new. For example, when Congress created the
National Water Commission (“NWC”) in 1973, it included in its charge an
instruction that it identify alternative ways of meeting future water needs,
“giving
consideration,
among
other
things,
to . . . interbasin
transfers . . . .”111 In its report, the NWC recognized that interbasin
transfers were already numerous, and that:
As economic demand for water increases, as available water
supplies in areas of shortage shrink, as technological capability
improves, and as national income grows, the feasibility of
interbasin transfers increases and the scale of the proposals grow
larger.112
In the ETSI litigation, the lower basin states objected to the coal slurry
project because it diverted water from the river basin; ETSI was a classic
transbasin diversion. Under the current Corps proposal, there are no limits
on place of use, and the prospects for moving water out of the basin appear
realistic, particularly when combined with a reliable pricing system. There

108 Rivers and Harbors, Flood Control Acts of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 216, 84 Stat.
1818 (1970).
109 See ER 1105-2-100, Parag. E-57b(2)(a)(2).
110. See generally Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000).
111. Nat’l Water Comm’n Act, Pub. L. No. 90-515. § 3(a)(1), 82 Stat. 868, 868 (1968).
112 Id.
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is no clear avenue, other than through Congress, by which the states may
assert their interest in keeping the River’s water within the basin.
X. THE ECOSYSTEM EFFECTS OF WATER COMMODITIZATION
Commoditizing reservoir water raises the issue whether the millions of
acre-feet of available surplus water will be marketed in balance with other
project purposes. The Corps is unlikely to fail to meet its obligation to
serve purposes such as hydropower and navigation, which represent
conventional economic value. But, will the same balance be struck when
competing uses are fish, wildlife and the delivery of ecosystem services?
The Corps has elected to prepare individual environmental impact
statements for its industrial water-marketing program on a reservoir-byreservoir basis, and based on the limited amounts allocated in the initial
proposals. However, the wording of the statute and regulations, combined
with the effect of the ETSI litigation, make clear that the current proposals,
although described in limited terms, actually authorize marketing of all
waters “not required because the authorized use for the water never
developed.” Thus, what is lacking is a cumulative environmental analysis
that considers the potential effect of an active and growing transbasin
demand for a large portion of the supply now made available for marketing.
XI. THE PLACE OF TRIBES AND STATES IN A FEDERAL WATER
MARKETING SYSTEM
The states and tribes in the basin do not have a strong position.
Predictably, they argue that the waters retained behind the federal dams are
actually just the flowing waters of the stream, which are under their control
and subject to their power to allocate through water permits or other
procedure. In the ETSI decision, the United States Supreme Court did not
address directly “the relative interests of the United States and South
Dakota in Lake Oahe water”113 but it did read the language of Section 6 as
granting the Corps “exclusive authority to contract to remove water for
industrial uses” from reservoir projects, like Oahe, that the Corps has
constructed and operates.114 The Court found the language of Section 6
“plain in every respect.”115
The legal issue is the Corp’s power over impounded water and whether
water stored by the government in federal reservoirs is itself a source of
power to allow allocation independent of the states and tribes. Professor
113 ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 498 n.2.
114. Id. at 506.
115. Id. at 505.
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Trelease describes the power in this way: “[i]mpounded water, not
appropriated by any person, could be similarly regarded as the property of
the United States, and this theory could be used to justify the distribution of
water by sale to those who would enter into contractual relations with the
United States . . . .”116
In 1975, the pending ETSI pipeline proposal led to hearings in the
United States Senate.117 The Corp’s statement at that time included the
following:
The States have authority to grant permits for the use of the natural
flow taken from the river. The right of the Federal Government to
control the use of water in its reservoirs is based upon the
legislation authorizing the construction and operation of the
reservoirs and upon Federal jurisdiction over navigated
waterways.118
The Corp’s initiatives under Section 6 today are consistent with that earlier
statement; the agency claims jurisdiction over waters stored in the
reservoirs.
States can no doubt issue a water permit under state law from the
state’s equitable share of the flowing river. However, the case is different
when the water to be diverted under the state permit is available only
because of the storage capacity provided by the federal reservoirs. Is the
water, once captured and stored pursuant to federal law, no longer subject to
state law? The question has not been answered by the courts, but the
argument exists that the Corps has the full power to allocate waters stored
in its reservoirs.
XII. CONCLUSION
The current industrial water marketing proposals return us to the
persistent issue: are river waters mere economic commodities, to be sold or
moved about when economic demand arises, or are they public amenities,
and thereby insulated from the full rigors of the marketplace? By way of
the Pick-Sloan plan, the Missouri River is already heavily committed to
serving short-term economic interests, particularly in the delivery of
flowing water for navigation, hydropower, power plant cooling, as well as
flat water for recreation. While industrial water marketing proposals are

116. Frank J. Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People,
States and Nation, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 158, 181 (1963).
117 Missouri River Basin Industrial Marketing, Pt. 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Energy Research and Water Resources, 94th Cong. 1 (1975).
118 Id. at 3.
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currently quite small in relation to the overall supply, they provide a lens
through which to observe an alternative future.
The development of WAWSA by North Dakota, along with the earlier
case of South Dakota’s ETSI proposal, are significant because they
represent one state initiating a sizeable diversion without consulting the
other states and tribes in the basin. Similarly, the Corps is initiating its
marketing program without fully integrating the states and the tribes into
the administrative process. Thus, by a series of ad hoc decisions, basin
waters are committed without reference to any agreed upon principles to
govern the use of the common resource. More fundamentally, this process
ignores the obvious fact that the waters of the Missouri River are
interconnected and part of a single hydrologic system. As stated earlier in
this essay, the modern history of the basin is that of an inability of basin
states to achieve any level of accord in river management. Recent events
suggest that the history is continuing.

